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ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection and Qualification, publishes three types of 
documents: 
 
 
Type 1 — Consensus documents 
Consensus documents contain harmonised principles, methods, approaches and procedures 
and emphasize the degree of harmonisation between ENIQ members. 
 
 
Type 2 — Position/Discussion documents 
Position/discussion documents contain compilations of ideas, express opinions, review 
practices, draw conclusions and make recommendations for technical projects. 
 
 
Type 3 — Technical reports 
Technical reports contain results of investigations, compilations of data, reviews and 
procedures without expressing any specific opinion or evaluation on behalf of ENIQ. 
 
 
This 'ENIQ TGR Discussion Document – Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection: An Overview 
for the Non-Specialist' (ENIQ Report No 46) is a type 2 document. 
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FOREWORD 
 
The present work is the outcome of the activities of the ENIQ Task Group on Risk 
(TGR).  
 
ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection and Qualification, was set up in 1992 in 
recognition of the importance of the issue of qualification of NDE inspection 
procedures used in in-service inspection programmes for nuclear power plants. Driven 
by European nuclear utilities and managed by the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) in Petten, the Netherlands, ENIQ was intended to be a 
network in which available resources and expertise could be managed at European 
level. It was also recognised that harmonisation in the field of codes and standards for 
inspection qualification would be a major advantage for all parties involved, and would 
ultimately increase the safety of European nuclear power plants. More information on 
the ENIQ network and its activities can be found at 
http://safelife.jrc.ec.europa.eu/eniq/. 
 
ENIQ activities are carried out by two sub-groups: the Task Group on Qualification 
(TGQ) focuses on the qualification of in-service inspection (ISI) systems, and the Task 
Group on Risk (TGR) focuses on risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) issues. A 
key achievement of ENIQ TGQ has been the issuing of a European Methodology 
Document for Inspection Qualification [1], which has been widely adopted across 
Europe. This document defines an approach to the qualification of inspection 
procedures, equipment and personnel based on a combination of technical 
justification and test piece trials. ENIQ TGR has published the European Framework 
Document for Risk-informed In-service Inspection [2], and works to produce more 
detailed recommended practices and discussion documents on several RI-ISI-specific 
issues. 
 
The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of the Framework Document 
and how the process of RI-ISI is commonly applied within Europe and elsewhere. It is 
intended as a reference source for a wide audience of engineers and technical staff 
who may not be routinely involved with RI-ISI, but who may benefit from a greater 
understanding and appreciation of the issues arising when applying risk concepts to 
the definition of an inspection program. 
 
The active members of the ENIQ Task Group on Risk are:  
 
R. ALZBUTAS     Lithuanian Energy Institute, Lithuania 
D. COUPLET    Tractebel, Belgium 
O. CRONVALL    VTT, Finland 
T. DAWOOD     EDF Energy, United Kingdom 
P. DILLSTROM    Inspecta Oy, Sweden 
R. FUCHS     Leibstadt NPP, Switzerland 
L. GANDOSSI    JRC, European Commission, the Netherlands 
J. GUNNARS     Inspecta Oy, Sweden 
L. HORACEK     NRI, Czech Republic 
E. KICHEV     Kozloduy NPP, Bulgaria 
P. LAFRENIERE    CANDU Owners Group, Canada 
A. LEIJON     Ringhals AB, Sweden 
P. LUOSTARINEN    Fortum Engineering Ltd, Finland 
O. MARTIN     JRC, European Commission, the Netherlands 
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Tobias MEISTER    Ringhals AB, Sweden 
Ilkka MÄNNISTÖ    VTT, Finland 
Patrick O'REGAN    EPRI, United States 
Charles SCHNEIDER   The Welding Institute, United Kingdom 
KAISA SIMOLA    VTT, Finland 
Adam TOFT     Serco Assurance, United Kingdom 
Richard VAN SONSBEEK   Applus RTD, The Netherlands 
Iikka VIRKKUNEN    Truflaw, Finland 
Anthony WALKER    Rolls-Royce, United Kingdom 
 
The author of this report is L. GANDOSSI (DG-JRC-IET). 
 
The voting members of the ENIQ Steering Committee are:  
 
J. AHONEN   Fortum, Finland  
T. DAEWOOD   British Energy, United Kingdom 
P. DOMBRET   Tractebel, Belgium 
K. HUKKANEN    Teollisuuden Voima OY, Finland 
P. KOPCIL    Dukovany NPP, Czech Republic 
E. MARTIN   EDF, France 
B. NEUNDORF    Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy, Germany 
J. NEUPAUER    Slovenské Elektrárne, Slovakia 
S. PÉREZ    Iberdrola, Spain 
A. RICHNAU    Ringhals AB, Sweden, Sweden 
R. SCHWAMMBERGER   Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt, Switzerland 
D. SZABÓ    Paks NPP, Hungary 
R. VAN BEUSEKOM   EPZ, The Netherlands  
 
The European Commission representatives in ENIQ are L. GANDOSSI and 
O. MARTIN. 
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1 THE ROLE OF IN-SERVICE INSPECTION 
In-service inspection (ISI) is an essential element of the defence in depth concept. ISI 
consists of non-destructive examination as well as pressure and leakage testing. ISI helps to 
confirm that the basic nuclear safety functions are preserved and that the probability of 
radioactive materials breaching containment is reduced. 
Defence in depth is defined by two principles: accident prevention and accident mitigation. 
This high level definition of defence in depth has been traditionally broken down further into 
five levels, the first two being [1]: 
1) Prevention of abnormal operation and failures. 
2) Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures. 
ISI plays an important role in the above-mentioned two levels of defence in depth. It 
contributes to the prevention of failures by monitoring plant status. Furthermore, it contributes 
to the control of abnormal operation by detecting degradation in mitigating systems. 
Risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) reflects recent developments in Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment (PSA) technology, the understanding of degradation mechanisms (e.g. 
structural reliability modelling, root cause evaluations) and the experience gained from nearly 
10,000 reactor years operating experience of NPPs. 
RI-ISI aims at rational plant safety management by taking into account the results of plant 
specific risk analyses. The fundamental idea is to identify high-risk locations where the 
inspection efforts should be concentrated. The objective is to provide an ongoing 
improvement in the overall plant safety, measured by risk, together with reduced doses for 
the inspection teams. 
The development of a RI-ISI programme requires expertise from a number of different 
disciplines including inspection, maintenance, design, materials, chemistry, stress analysis, 
systems, PSA, operations and safety. It also requires a long-term co-ordinated management 
commitment through inspection qualification, inspection result analysis and final feedback to 
the risk analysis, in order to maintain a living ISI programme. 
2 RISK CONCEPTS 
Risk is defined herein in a common engineering sense, as the product of the consequences 
of a failure and the probability of that failure occurring: 
 Risk = {Probability of Failure} x {Consequence of that Failure} 
Failure of a structural component is an event involving leakage, rupture or any condition that 
would disable its ability to perform its intended safety function. For piping, failure usually 
involves a leak or a rupture, resulting in a reduction or loss of the pressure-retaining 
capability of the element in question.  
In Probability Safety Analysis (PSA), the probability of failure is defined either in terms of 
failure frequencies or failure probabilities per demand.  
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The precise definition of the consequence of failure is normally a matter of negotiation 
between the utility and the regulator. Whatever metric is chosen, it must be measured as an 
outcome that is conditional on the probability of failure as defined above. Typically, 
Conditional Core Damage Probability (CDDP) or Conditional Core Damage Frequency 
(CCDF), as defined by a Level-1 PSA, constitute the minimum requirement for consequence 
evaluation. Because probability is dimensionless, it follows that the metric of risk is the same 
as the metric of consequence of failure. 
3 MAIN STEPS OF THE RI-ISI PROCESS 
An overview of the fundamental aspects of most RI-ISI methodologies is depicted in 
Figure 1. This figure reflects the basic technical elements of the risk-informed concept as 
relevant to developing an ISI program. The following main steps summarize a typical RI-ISI 
process: 
1. Decision of type and level of analysis (qualitative, quantitative, etc,) 
2. Definition of RI-ISI program scope. 
3. Collection of the required input data. 
4. Analysis of failure consequence. 
5. Analysis of failure probability.  
6. Risk ranking. 
7. Definition of the ISI programme. 
8. Evaluation of risk impact of changes to inspection program. 
9. Long term management of a RI-ISI program.  
3.1 Type and level of analysis 
Three different approaches to RI-ISI can be envisioned: quantitative, semi-quantitative and 
qualitative.  
 
In a quantitative approach, numerical estimates are determined for Probabilities of Failures 
(POFs) and Consequences of Failures (COFs). Fully validated and verified Structural 
Reliability Models (SRM) are used to determine POFs and the plant Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment is used to calculate COFs.  
 
In a qualitative approach, both the POFs and COFs are characterised by qualitative terms, 
such as very low, low, high, etc. In this framework, expert elicitation is used to rank the POF 
and COF of individual components.  
 
A semi-quantitative approach is one where the COFs are based on PSA results, but the PSA 
information may be expressed equally well in quantitative or qualitative terms. The failure 
probabilities may be partly evaluated using fully validated and verified SRM, but partly also 
using experience data and expert elicitation.  
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Figure 1.  
Main elements of the RI-ISI process 
 
In the nuclear industry the risks are assessed by means of PSA, which is an advanced 
quantitative approach (versus the more qualitative risk assessments used in other hazardous 
industries). The use of PSA is the foundation of risk-informed approaches in the nuclear 
industry, and thus a purely qualitative approach to RI-ISI that does not make use of PSA 
insights would be difficult to justify. A qualitative analysis could be used to allow systems to 
be quickly prioritised for further more detailed (quantitative) risk analysis. 
 
A quantitative approach offers the possibility to quantify the risk change achieved when 
implementing the RI-ISI programme. However, it is recognised that the current state of 
knowledge and understanding of some of the degradation mechanisms and the availability of 
the required plant data can be insufficient to accurately quantify the probability of failure. 
Likewise, many current PSA analyses may not be detailed enough for the level required in an 
ISI application, and thus the consequence analysis must necessarily be complemented by 
some degree of qualitative assessment. 
 
In conclusion, the most realistic approach to the development of any RI-ISI programme today 
is a semi-quantitative one, based on a plant-specific PSA and with due cognisance of the 
current mechanistic understanding of any degradation mechanisms. 
6. Risk ranking. 
1. Decision of type and level of analysis 
(qualitative, quantitative, etc,) 
2. Definition of RI-ISI program scope. 
3. Collection of the required input data. 
4. Analysis of failure 
consequence. 
5. Analysis of failure 
probability. 
7. Definition of the ISI programme. 
8. Evaluation of risk impact of changes 
to inspection program. 
9. Long term management 
of a RI-ISI program. 
  
  12 
 
The risk assessment in a RI-ISI programme can be carried out either at the element level 
(e.g. each weld and discontinuity) or for groups of contiguous elements where all relevant 
conditions are the same. 
The advantage of evaluation at element level is that the output will be unique for every 
element and there will be a clear distinction between elements. However, to reach this 
distinction between the elements, a rather large amount of detailed input data is needed 
which might be prohibitive from a cost point of view. Grouping elements with the same 
conditions (a process termed segmentation) is less time and resource consuming. The initial 
segmentation is normally based on the postulated direct consequences of a failure, but it is 
important that indirect consequences are also considered. Piping segments are normally 
defined at major components such as pumps, heat exchangers, check-valves, remote 
controlled valves or at pipe size changes.  
3.2 Definition of RI-ISI program scope 
The scope definition is a step in which the boundary of the programme is clearly identified, 
that is, which systems and which structural elements (circumferential welds, longitudinal 
welds, socket welds, attachments, lugs, etc.) are to be included in the programme. 
 
The scope of a RI-ISI programme can be either a full scope programme or (for instance 
when an alternative programme is already in place) a partial scope programme.  
 
A full scope programme can be defined as including all passive components and structures, 
including those relied upon to perform a nuclear safety function during all design-basis plant 
conditions and those whose failure could compromise the function of safety-related 
structures, systems, or components or could cause a reactor trip or actuation of a safety-
related system. 
 
A partial scope programme can be defined as any subset of the systems or functions 
defining the full scope. A partial scope application is normally justified, for instance, if an 
alternative (deterministic) programme is in place for the other passive components or piping 
not addressed by the RI-ISI programme.  
 
A full scope RI-ISI programme is superior because it allows the treatment of all systems in a 
consistent and objective manner. Nonetheless, it is recognised that in the application of RI-
ISI, a partial scope programme can be justified.  
3.3 Collection of the required input data 
Data collection is an essential part of the RI-ISI process, as it constitutes the basis for the 
whole analysis and decision process. The process of risk-informed inspection planning 
brings together a large amount of information from many different sources, which needs to 
be collected and analysed. This information can be classified in the following five categories: 
 
1) Equipment data. 
2) Historical plant operating data. 
3) General nuclear industry information. 
4) Safety Analysis Report and technical specifications. 
5) PSA data. 
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The availability and accessibility of this information vary depending on the particular 
circumstances. Data collection is likely to be a resource-demanding phase in the RI-ISI 
process but the data gathered should be of considerable value for many safety or reliability 
related activities, such as periodic safety reviews.  
3.4 Analysis of failure consequence  
The failure of a passive component in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) can basically lead to one 
of the following classes of events of interest: 
 
1) Initiating event: A pressure boundary failure occurs in an operating system resulting 
in an initiating event. 
2) Loss of mitigating ability (stand-by): A pressure boundary failure occurs in a standby 
system and does not result in an initiating event, but degrades the mitigating 
capabilities of a system or train.  
3) Loss of mitigating ability (demand): A pressure boundary failure occurs in a standby 
system when the system/train operation is required by an independent demand. 
4) Combination: A pressure boundary failure causes an initiating event with an 
additional loss of mitigating ability. 
 
The consequence analysis step of the RI-ISI process aims at evaluating the impacts of any 
of the above-mentioned events on plant risk. The consequence evaluation consists of the 
following primary steps: 
 
a) A qualitative Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) that determines the plant 
impacts of postulated failures of postulated sizes (e.g. small, medium, complete 
rupture). This step can consume the largest share of resources. 
 
b) Qualification of the PSA for RI-ISI application. 
 
c) Quantitative analysis with PSA. 
 
PSA techniques have been developed since the 1970s [4] and PSA studies exist today for 
most types of nuclear power plants and individual power stations. Although the level of 
details and quality of these studies vary, the PSA methodology has become a well-known 
and frequently used tool in the analysis of nuclear safety. 
 
The following items are considered critical if a robust interface between PSA and RI-ISI is to 
be developed: 
 
• The levels and scope of PSA to be used in RI-ISI (sub-section 3.4.1). 
• PSA quality, limitations and uncertainties (sub-section 3.4.2). 
• Passive component failure treatment (sub-section 3.4.3). 
 
 
3.4.1 Levels and scope of PSA to be used in RI-ISI 
 
PSAs are performed at different levels, dealing with different types of consequences: 
 
Level 1:  Assessment of plant failures leading to Core Damage (CD) and the 
estimation of Core Damage Frequency (CDF). 
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Level 2:  Estimation of off-site fission product release. Consequences are usually 
expressed in terms of Large Early Release Frequency (LERF). 
Level 3:  Assessment of off-site consequences leading to estimates of the effects of 
fission product release on human health. Consequences are usually 
expressed in terms of human fatalities, public radiation doses and 
environmental pollution. 
 
All modern NPPs have plant-specific PSA studies, usually at Levels 1 and 2. Recent RI-ISI 
applications have mainly relied on the Level 1 consequence analysis.  
 
The use of Level 2 consequence (e.g. large early release) could be important for RI-ISI 
application, especially for reactors whose complete primary pressure boundary is not fully 
covered by the containment structure (for instance, RBMK and BWR reactors). In this case it 
must be borne in mind that Level 2 studies are based on assumptions and hypotheses that 
can be very difficult to verify in practice and thus are in general subject to higher 
uncertainties than Level 1 studies (i.e. estimates of core damage). 
 
 
3.4.2 PSA quality, limitations and uncertainties 
 
Due to the small probabilities of failure of passive components in comparison with active 
components, the former usually only contribute to a small proportion of the total plant risk 
evaluated in the PSA study. Moreover, because of low probabilities of failure, the data 
available regarding passive failures is usually limited. This has naturally led to very limited 
treatment of such failures within PSA studies. Due consideration must be given to this fact 
and how the passive components should be treated in the consequence analysis. 
 
It is important that the PSA analysis employed reflect in a realistic way the actual design, 
construction, operational practices and operational experiences of the plant. It is a good 
practice to qualify and/or certify the PSA study for use in RI-ISI application, by fulfilling 
demands specified by ASME standard or IAEA standards/requirements. The 
qualification/certification could also be performed by peer review of the PSA for RI-ISI 
application. The qualification of the PSA should be documented [5-10]. 
 
Each PSA analysis is subject to unavoidable uncertainties, such as parameter uncertainties, 
model uncertainties and completeness uncertainties. Parameter uncertainties related to 
statistical data are usually quantified and a PSA study provides uncertainty boundaries as a 
part of its output. Model and completeness uncertainties are normally not included in the 
PSA study, but they have to be evaluated in the process of PSA qualification. 
 
 
3.4.3 Passive component failure treatment 
 
Pipe breaks are modelled directly as initiating events such as Loss of Coolant Accidents 
(LOCAs), main steam or feed-water line breaks or flooding. PSA studies may spatially 
subdivide the pipework into zones and then consider various types of LOCAs occurring 
within the zone as initiating events but the studies do not normally model initiating events at 
segment or element level. Furthermore, the components are normally modelled in the PSA 
with two states: full function or total failure. In the case of piping, these states are ‘no 
leakage’ and ‘complete pipe break’. Thus, a ‘partly failed’ component (such as a crack or a 
small leak) that is handled by a manual action is not modelled in the basic PSA.  
 
As the modelling of structural components in the base PSA may be coarse and deficient for 
many systems, additional analysis is required to determine the consequences at the degree 
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of detail needed in RI-ISI. For instance, a complementary FMEA could be conducted in order 
to define both the direct and indirect impact of failure on plant operation.  
 
Indirect effects include failure consequences affecting other systems, components or piping 
segments, such as pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, decompression waves, high 
environmental temperatures, etc. Indirect effects of passive component boundary failures 
may have a significant influence on the evaluation of core damage frequency. Spatial 
consequences are determined based on the location of the failure and relative position of 
important equipment. 
 
The base PSA does not usually include models of passive component failures that could 
result in the loss of mitigating ability (e.g. safety system pipe break). A way to address such 
situations is to identify basic events or groups of events already modelled in the PSA, whose 
failure captures the effects of a piping segment failure. This method is sometimes called the 
‘surrogate component approach’. 
3.5 Analysis of failure probability  
The first step in the assessment of the probability of failure of a structural element is the 
identification of the potential degradation mechanisms. This requires the qualitative 
evaluation of a range of influential parameters, such as, design and fabrication information, 
loadings, environmental conditions, and inspection results. This analysis should be 
supported with a review of operating experience from the plant, its sister units and similar 
plants as well as insights from world-wide generic data.  
 
Ideally, the probability of failure of components or sites that are potentially in need of 
inspection should be calculated in a quantitative way, implying the use of Structural 
Reliability Models (SRMs). However, two important facts are recognised concerning the use 
of SRMs. Firstly, such models do not exist for all the potential degradation mechanisms that 
currently affect nuclear power plants. Secondly, for degradation mechanisms that do have a 
viable SRM, there is only a limited acceptance that these estimates can be seen as 
representing some form of true or absolute value. This implies that the evaluation of the 
probability of failure for all potential ISI sites will necessarily yield a mixture of quantitative 
and qualitative assessments. Quantitative values, where they exist, may serve to quantify 
relative differences in the probability of failure from one site to another.  
 
For these reasons, the most likely way failure probabilities can be presently estimated for RI-
ISI applications is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative assessments. Such 
an approach is referred to as a ‘semi-quantitative’ analysis. A semi-quantitative analysis of 
the probability of failure can be obtained by:  
 
1) Use of structural reliability models, where they exist, to provide a good estimate 
of the relative differences in the failure probabilities (see 3.5.1). 
2) Statistical estimates based on both plant-specific and global databases in order 
to provide anchoring points for both the SRM analysis and the expert judgments 
(see 3.5.2). 
3) Use of formal expert judgements using a combination of deterministic structural 
models and design insights (see 3.5.3).  
 
There is not a single, optimal method for estimating probabilities of failure.  
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3.5.1 Structural reliability models 
 
Structural reliability models (SRM) are essential tools in the evaluation of probabilities of 
failure for components of nuclear power plants, even if it must be recognised that there exist 
several degradation mechanisms which are not adequately covered with the available 
analytical tools. 
 
A clear advantage offered by SRMs is the possibility to quantify the influence of inspections 
both in terms of inspection capability and frequency. This is a key factor in RI-ISI since it is 
desirable to select the most appropriate inspection capability for every risk site.  
 
SRMs should be adequately verified and validated. To this end, a number of steps can be 
defined [11-14]: 
 
1) The basic programming should be shown to have suitable quality assurance 
documentation. 
2) The scope, the analytical assumptions and the limitations of the modelling 
capability should be well defined. 
3) The analytical assumptions should be well grounded and based on theory that is 
accepted as representative of the situations considered by the given SRM.  
4) The model should be capable of reproducing the data on which its analytical 
assumptions are based. Examples should be provided that can demonstrate its 
general agreement with the available experimental data. 
5) Attempts should be made to show how the model compares with the world or 
field data, accepting the inherent limitation of this data.  
6) The model should be benchmarked against other SRM models within the same 
field or scope and any differences should be adequately explained. 
 
 
3.5.2 Estimation from operating experience data 
 
Operating experience data provides useful qualitative and quantitative information on the 
degradation of structural components. For example, Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) was 
discovered from field failures. Operating experience data covers not only leak and rupture 
data, but also other information on the presence of non-critical levels of degradation, such as 
small defects and wall thinning. The degradation information can be of considerable value in 
the development of SRMs and more generally in the assessment of structural failure 
probabilities.  
 
However, when reliability parameters are estimated from structural component failures or 
degradation databases, the following shortcomings have been identified: 
 
1) Passive components usually have an increasing failure rate (i.e. ageing), and 
thus the exponential distribution does not correctly model the failure occurrence. 
2) The data quality may be insufficient for obtaining reliable estimates due to missing 
information related to the component population or to uncertainties related to failure 
mechanisms and root causes. 
3) Data is often very scarce. 
 
Due to the shortcomings related to the quality and quantity of data, the estimates of passive 
component failure probabilities are subject to large uncertainties. For RI-ISI applications, 
probability of failure estimates obtainable from world-wide or generic data may not be 
sufficient. However, the data can be extremely valuable in establishing prior probabilities. 
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These values can then act as an anchor for either the SRM estimates or expert judgement, 
using plant-specific information, to identify the distribution of the probability of failure 
throughout the plant-specific sites. 
 
 
3.5.3 Use of expert judgement through expert elicitation  
 
A possible alternative to employing SRM or operating experience data is to use expert 
judgement, preferably through the use of formal expert elicitation. 
 
Well-structured expert elicitations can be a powerful tool for expanding the range of 
application of a RI-ISI. Such elicitations support and integrate individual expert judgements to 
provide an auditable set of probability of failure estimates. However, it is important to ensure 
that the use of this expert judgement is conducted within a structured expert elicitation 
process [15]. 
 
It is recognised that experts are often not very familiar with probabilities, especially with 
subjective probability statements, and must therefore be adequately trained. The person 
leading the structured expert elicitation, usually called "normative expert", must have proper 
knowledge in decision analysis, probabilities and statistics and has the responsibility to 
facilitate the process by giving training, conducting the elicitation and aggregating the expert 
opinions. A discussion on the expert assessment approach within the nuclear industry can be 
found for example in [15] and [16]. 
3.6 Risk ranking 
Combining the estimates from the probability of failure and the consequence of failure 
assessments forms the risk ranking. The risk ranking can be carried out at either element 
level or segment level. (A segment is normally defined as a continuous length of piping with 
the same degradation mechanism and failure consequence.) 
 
 
3.6.1 Graphical representation of risk 
 
Each segment or element can be ranked from highest to lowest according to its risk. A useful 
way to evaluate the risk of failure and clearly represent it in a graphical way is to develop a 
risk plot, a risk matrix or a Pareto risk diagram.  
 
In a risk plot, each component is represented as a point on a log-log plot. The consequence 
of failure is represented on the x-axis. The probability of failure is represented on the y-axis. 
Figure 2 gives an example of such a risk plot. 
 
A risk plot provides a clear picture of how the risk is distributed over the range of 
consequences. Given the nature of the risk plot, log-log axes, sites of constant risk are 
identified by straight lines. This fact greatly aids risk visualisation and ranking for the given 
parameters and assumptions. Parallel lines of constant risk can be drawn at fixed distances, 
identifying risk bands. 
 
In a semi-quantitative approach to risk, probability of failure and consequence of failure are 
not numerically evaluated in absolute terms, but are ranked using either a qualitative scale 
such as high, medium, low, or broad categories such as 10-3 to 10-4 etc. In this case, a risk 
matrix can be used to represent the rankings in the form of subsets as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2 
Risk plot (the plot is purely illustrative) 
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Figure 3 
Risk Matrix (the values used in this table are purely illustrative  
and should in no way be taken as a requirement). 
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3.6.2 Safety-significant sites 
 
The development of a ranking does not in itself identify directly the sites that will be selected 
for inspection, as discussed below. 
 
Further, in addressing this question, it must be borne in mind that in-service inspection leads 
to radiation exposure to the inspection personnel. Each combination of ISI programme is 
associated with a certain radiation exposure. In principle, it is possible to develop ISI 
programmes with the same risk reduction but with different total radiation exposure. Clearly, 
when faced with such choice, the RI-ISI programme resulting in as little radiation exposure 
as possible should be chosen. 
 
The process of identifying the safety-significant sites to be included in the inspection scope 
consists, broadly speaking, of two steps.  
 
The first step consists in the identification of risk outliers. Risk outliers are sites that have a 
much higher risk than the overall mean risk level for all sites. Risk outliers, dominating the 
overall risk, should be treated carefully to avoid giving a skewed view of the risk distribution. 
The very occurrence of risk outliers should be seen as a situation requiring special treatment. 
Inspection alone may not be considered sufficient to address the risk from such sites and 
consideration is normally given to other complementary methods (i.e. continuous monitoring, 
improved leak rate detection, load reduction, component replacement, etc.), 
 
The second step normally consists of identifying the potentially safety-significant sites. This is 
normally done by defining a risk value, relative to the highest risk (but excluding any outliers) 
that can be considered as the level separating potentially safety-significant sites from those 
that can be considered as non safety-significant. Sites falling above this level are considered 
as potentially safety-significant.  
 
The specific risk level chosen depends on many factors, and is a matter of agreement 
between the utility and the regulatory body. Among such factors are for example the risk 
distribution of the plant, the definition of risk outliers, the nature of risk associated with each 
site, and more in general, the ambition the utility has with its RI-ISI programme. 
 
An expert panel is then used to review the potentially safety-significant sites that have been 
identified. This panel is formed by several individuals with expertise in all the relevant 
technical areas related to the RI-ISI process, and has the task to review the information, 
analysis and insights that have been used to identify the safety significant sites [15].  
 
More in detail, the expert panel review process can cover: 
 
• Verification that the technical basis for defining the scope of the programme is sound. 
• Verification that the system boundaries are clearly defined and that the delineation of 
piping segments can be justified. 
• Verification that the failure consequences assessed for each segment are accurate 
(both direct and indirect). 
• Verification that the procedures for estimating failure probability have been based on 
appropriate databases, analytical methods and/or Structural Reliability Models (SRMs).  
• Verification that, if SRMs have been used, the limitations in the models and in the key 
input parameters have been assessed. 
• Verification that the estimated failure rates have addressed the limiting failure type 
(small leak, disabling leak or break), the relevant failure mechanisms and ageing 
effects, normal and design-limiting loadings, design and fabrication factors and material 
properties. 
• Verification that the estimated failure rates are consistent with plant operating history. 
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• Verification of the consistency of classification among segments within a system and 
between systems. 
• Verification that uncertainties have been properly considered and treated. 
• Review of the selected piping segments in order to identify any proposed relaxation in 
inspection requirements from prior practices and assess their effect on plant safety. 
• Consideration of strategies other than inspection. 
 
To summarise, the expert panel determine a ranking of safety significant sites, using 
qualitative and quantitative information from PSA and failure probability evaluations and in 
combination with traditional engineering insights and design basis information. 
 
This ranking identifies the primary candidates for inclusion in a risk-informed inspection 
programme. The next step is to make the final selection, i.e. to define the ISI programme. 
3.7 Definition of the ISI programme  
The overall principle underlying the definition of the RI-ISI programme, e.g. the identification 
and selection of individual sites for inspection, is that the proposed inspection programme 
must ensure the maintenance of an adequate level of defence in depth. 
 
After having identified a risk ranking of the safety-significant sites, the sub-set to be included 
in the inspection programme must be determined. In selecting these sites, other criteria than 
risk are normally considered. Such criteria are, for example, the severity of the degradation 
mechanisms, radiation doses that the inspectors will receive, ease of accessibility, inspection 
costs, etc. 
 
Sites whose calculated risk is not particularly high in the ranking, but that are characterised 
by a particularly high value of the failure consequence (and, necessarily, by a low probability 
of failure) are normally considered for inclusion. Inspecting these sites is typically justified on 
the ground of defence-in-depth.  
 
Due consideration is also given to the reverse situation, i.e. sites characterised by low 
consequence but high probability of failure sites. Inspecting these sites can contribute to 
increase plant availability and it can thus make economic sense to include them in the 
inspection programme. 
 
After having established an initial selection of candidate sites based on these criteria, the risk 
associated with such elements is compared with the risk associated with the sites forming 
the scope of the current (deterministic) ISI programme. Typically, when moving to a RI-ISI 
programme from a traditional one, the Regulator demands that a risk reduction is achieved. 
Risk neutrality, or even a small risk increase (when offset by other advantages, such as a 
marked reduction of radiation doses to workers) can be acceptable, when agreed between 
the utility and the Regulator. 
 
The risk reduction achieved depends not only on the risk addressed, but also on the 
capability and frequency (intervals) of the inspections. This is discussed below. 
 
The scope of the RI-ISI programme may also need to be completed adding sites which 
require inspection in order to meet other legal requirements, for instance in relation to the 
safety protection of workers, etc. 
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3.7.1 Inspection intervals 
 
Currently, most in-service inspection intervals are either set by a code, such as ASME 
section XI [17], by some consensus between the regulator and the utility or by some form of 
deterministic principle, usually based on design considerations and general technical 
experience. 
 
In principle, optimal inspection intervals could be determined by means of, for example, 
validated SRMs coupled with the knowledge of Probability of Detection (POD) curves [18]. 
 
 
3.7.2 Inspection qualification 
 
Within Europe, ENIQ has an established methodology for inspection qualification [1]. An 
essential input to the ENIQ qualification process is the identification of appropriate inspection 
qualification requirements defining the defects of concern for which highly reliable detection 
and sizing is to be demonstrated. The ENIQ qualification process, if followed to a successful 
outcome, provides high confidence that the inspection system can achieve the inspection 
qualification requirements for defect sizing and detection.  
 
The ENIQ qualification process does not provide a quantitative measure of inspection 
efficiency. Typically, the output statement from the ENIQ qualification process is expressed 
in linguistic terms such as ‘highly reliable’ or ‘highly efficient’. A model has been proposed to 
use expert judgement to quantify a qualitative qualification process [19]. 
3.8 Evaluation of risk impact of changes to inspection program 
A quantitative estimate of the risk reduction achieved can only be calculated if a quantitative 
measure of the inspection capability (for instance, a POD curve) is known. When such a 
measure of the inspection capability is available, a structural reliability model could be used 
to quantify the risk reduction. In many cases, this measure is either not available or it would 
require a disproportionate use of resources to obtain it. 
 
To gain confidence that the proposed RI-ISI programme is at least as effective as the current 
ISI programme in reducing risk, the ISI programmes can be compared by using as input the 
risk estimates of each site, the inspection intervals, and a hypothetical probability of 
detection.  
 
This assessment should confirm that the initial selection of elements for the RI-ISI 
programme does not produce an unacceptable risk impact. If an unacceptable risk impact is 
calculated, then adjustments to the selection of elements to meet the risk acceptance criteria 
may be carried out. 
3.9 Long term management of a RI-ISI program 
The risk assessment provides a snapshot of the risk distribution within the ISI boundary at a 
given point in time. The risk assessment can be kept ‘live’ so that it reflects as accurately as 
possible the distribution of risk within the ISI boundary.  
 
Changes in the calculated risk can arise either from a change in the failure probability or from 
a change in the consequences of the failure. The main issues with a potential influence on 
risk ranking are: 
 
 
  
  22 
• Plant changes; 
• Changes in operating and maintenance procedures; 
• Changes in input information for failure probability and consequence evaluation, due to, 
for example, operating experience; 
• Changes in models used for failure probability and consequence estimation. 
 
The determination of an effective risk-informed inspection strategy typically requires the 
development of a feedback procedure based on the idea of updating the risk ranking after 
plant changes affecting the probabilities of failure or consequences of failure have taken 
place.  
 
The affected portions of the RI-ISI programme are re-evaluated as new information affecting 
the implementation of the programme becomes available (component system design 
change, plant PSA changes, plant operating condition changes, industry-wide failure 
notifications, etc). Also very relevant is the information collected after one inspection 
programme has been completed, as this increases the knowledge of the plant. This 
information clearly influences the assessment of the site probability of failure as the 
uncertainty concerning the presence or absence of a degradation mechanism is changed.  
 
This "living" process is one of the strengths of the risk-informed approach, as it leads to an 
enabling process that is both flexible and responsive to emerging problems. 
 
If evidence of significant damage is found by inspection it is assumed that actions are taken 
to reduce the increased risk. These actions include substitution, repair, or fitness for purpose 
assessments to justify maintenance in service coupled with prescriptive follow-up inspections 
of the affected locations at subsequent outages. Even if no evidence of defects is found after 
the risk-informed ISI programme is completed, it is still important to evaluate the meaning of 
the result. An important issue then becomes the capability of the inspection technique.  
 
ENIQ TGR has developed a discussion document on this issue [20]. Some guidance 
regarding living probabilistic safety assessment can be found in [21]. Reference [22] provides 
eight examples of plants that have conducted updates to their RI-ISI programmes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  23 
4 References 
1. European Methodology for Qualification of Non-Destructive Testing, Issue 3, ENIQ 
report No 31, EUR 22906 EN, 2007. 
2. European framework document for risk-informed in-service inspection, ENIQ report No 
23, EUR 21581 EN, 2005. 
3. Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety, INSAG- 10, IAEA, Vienna, Austria, 1996. 
4. WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), Reactor Safety Study, An Assessment of Accident 
Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
October 1975. 
5. ASME - Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant 
Applications- RA-S-2002. 
6. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Peer Review Process Guidance, Revision A3, Nuclear 
Energy Institute, NEI-00-02, March 2002. 
7. A Framework for Quality Assurance Programme for PSA, IAEA TECDOC 1101, 1999. 
8. Applications of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for nuclear power plants, IAEA-
TECDOC-1200, 2001. 
9. Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessments by Regulatory Bodies, Safety Reports 
Series No. 25, 2002. 
10. Determining the quality of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for applications in 
nuclear power plants, IAEA-TECDOC-1511, July 2006.  
11. O.J.V. Chapman, “Definition of a set of criteria that should be met by a suitable 
structural reliability model”, NURBIM report D2, May 2004. 
12. B. Brickstad, “WP-4, Review and benchmarking of SRMs and associated software”, 
NURBIM report D4, May 2004. 
13. H. Schulz, T. Schimpfke, B. Brickstad, O.J.V. Chapman, B. Shepherd, S. Kelly, S. 
Olsson, J. Wintle, A. Muhammed, K. Simola, NURBIM Final Report, Fifth Framework of 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Project: NURBIM, Contract No. 
FIKS-CT-2001-00172,  
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp5-euratom/docs/nurbim_projrep_en.pdf 
14. ENIQ Recommended Practice 9: Verification and Validation of Structural Reliability 
Models and Associated Software to Be Used in Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection 
Programmes, ENIQ report No 30, EUR 22228 EN, 2007. 
15. ENIQ Recommended Practice 11: Guidance on Expert Panels in RI-ISI, ENIQ report No 
34, EUR 22234 EN, 2008 
16. Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, Final 
Report, US NRC NUREG-1150, Vols. 1-3, December 1990. 
17. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI: Rules for In-service Inspection of 
Nuclear Power Plant Components, Document Number: ASME Section XI, American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2001. 
18. L. Gandossi & C. Annis, ENIQ TGR Technical Document: Probability of Detection 
Curves - Statistical Best-Practices, ENIQ report No 41, 24429 EN – 2010 
19. L. Gandossi & K. Simola, A Bayesian Framework for the Quantitative Modelling of the 
ENIQ Methodology for Qualification of Non-Destructive Testing, EUR 22675 EN, 2007. 
20. ENIQ TGR Discussion Document: Updating of Risk-Informed Inspection Programmes, 
ENIQ Report No 37, EUR 23929 EN, December 2009.  
21. Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (LPSA), IAEA-TECDOC-1106, 1999. 
22. Living Program Guidance To Maintain Risk Informed In-service Inspection Programs 
For Nuclear Plant Piping Systems, Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 04-05, April 2004. 
 
 
  
  
European Commission 
 
EUR 25199 EN – Joint Research Centre – Institute for Energy and Transport 
Title: ISK-INFORMED IN-SERVICE INSPECTION: AN OVERVIEW FOR THE NON-SPECIALIST 
 
Author: Luca GANDOSSI (DG-JRC-IET) 
 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
2012 – 24 pp. – 21 x 29.7 cm 
EUR – Scientific and Technical Research series – ISSN 1831-9424 
ISBN 978-92-79-23017-2 
doi:10.2790/42657 
 
Abstract 
The European Framework Document for Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection (RI-ISI) (ENIQ report 23) was 
published in 2005, with the goal to provide general guidelines to utilities both for developing RI-ISI approaches 
and for using pre-established approaches or adapting them to the European nuclear environment, taking into 
account national regulatory requirements and utility-specific characteristics. 
 
The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of the Framework Document and how the process of 
RI-ISI is commonly applied within Europe and elsewhere. It is intended as a reference source for a wide 
audience of engineers and technical staff who may not be routinely involved with RI-ISI, but who may benefit 
from a greater understanding and appreciation of the issues arising when applying risk concepts to the definition 
of an inspection program.  
 
  
  
How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), where you can place 
an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain their contact details by 
sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
 
 
  
  
The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support for the 
conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a service of the
European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of science and technology 
for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves the common interest of the
Member States, while being independent of special interests, whether private or national. 
 
 
LD
-N
A
-25199-EN
-N
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
